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In the 2019 parliamentary elections, the Finnish populist nationalist party True Finns 
campaigned with a seven-minute YouTube video abounding with what Aarhus-based 
fictionality scholars Henrik Skov Nielsen and Simona Zetterberg Gjerlevsen would 
call intentional “signals” of fictionality. Mixing footage with animation, the video 
manages to come across as a parody of several genres of speculative fiction: Marvel 
comics, dystopian Hollywood blockbuster films, video games. It tells a story of a 
blood-thirsty “Pissed Off” monster created by the accumulating frustration and anger 
of the people witnessing the corruption of the elite and mainstream media who use 
immigration to further their own vicious ends. The video begins with the party leader 
Jussi Halla-aho holding a comic in his hands in a dark library and ends with a direct 
address to the viewer: “As you know, there is no pissed off monster and it’s not going 
to come and save anyone. The old parties are not going to change their objectives. If 
you want change, you have to vote for change. Use your power.”i 
The video, representing violence and sabotage both toward government 
institutions and on the streets, worked as it was supposed: appalled social media users 
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took care of the distribution and the video was rapidly all over the media. Several 
social sciences and humanities scholars were asked to comment on the video, myself 
included. In my reply to the national broadcasting company I mentioned that the 
video is a perfect example of what my narratological colleagues nowadays might call 
the “rhetorical force of fictionality” (as in the target essay by Walsh). In the public 
debate surrounding the campaign video, fictionality played completely into the hands 
of True Finns, the rhetorical force of fictionality culminating in the party leader’s 
characteristically sour public response to accusations of inciting political violence: 
“So now you want to ban movies too?” The controversy can be roughly understood as 
a struggle over generic macroframing in public discourse: the True Finns PR 
machinery obviously benefitted from foregrounding the video’s aesthetic quality as a 
pastiche of—not just any fictional genres but precisely—speculative fiction which, in 
all its speculativeness, might come across as fictional even to a second degree in the 
public understanding (although not according to rhetorical definitions of fictionality). 
The opposing framing activities, in turn, reminded of the affective potential of 
fictional representations, and rightly so. In research, this stance is best exemplified by 
Noël Carroll, as referenced in Richard Walsh’s target essay: “it is possible to entertain 
a proposition as unasserted, and yet have an emotional response to it” (Walsh 16). 
Yet, despite of raising public awareness of the affective potential of political fictions, 
many of the responses by politicians and other influencers at the other end of the 
political spectrum were exceedingly naivé, discussions focusing, for example, on 
whether a man actually got killed in the fictional universe of the video. So, alas, even 
the attempts at criticism by the political opponents were subsumed within the rhetoric 
of fictionality, and the moral of the narrative act was reduced to the moral of the 
		
story. Yet another populist strategy proved a complete success, with fictionality 
directing political action. 
 Having now read Walsh’s target essay, I am increasingly convinced that the 
new rhetorical theory of fictionality promoted by Wash, the Aarhus scholars, and now 
also James Phelan, has much more to offer for the study of fictionality in nonliterary 
contexts than it has for the study of generic fictions, with the possible exception of the 
diachronic perspective listed in Walsh’s concluding prospects for future study. For 
example, I do not find Walsh’s example of Mrs. Dalloway’s ending at all helpful in 
understanding how a rhetorical–fictional approach to much-studied fiction would help 
us delineate all the possible noninformative “relevance” or “points” of fictional 
narration. Instead, I find Walsh’s approach to fictionality as a rhetorical strategy in 
any discourse extremely helpful in elaborating on the relationship between 
contemporary storytelling practices and what has come to be called the post-truth era, 
or more specifically, post-truth politics. From this perspective, the most concrete, 
graspable rhetorical affordance of fictionality is its resistance to the much-touted cure 
for post-truthfulness, namely fact-checking: it can be deduced from Walsh’s definition 
of fictionality that a fictional proposition cannot be falsified. This implication of the 
rhetorical fictionality theory is surprisingly little discussed. Stefan Iversen and Henrik 
Skov Nielsen touch upon it briefly in their analysis of Barack Obama’s rhetoric of 
fictionality, noting, for example, that “[m]aking nonfictional claims about fictional 
statements might even be perceived as pathological” (137). Yet Iversen and Nielsen’s 
blatant admiration for Obama as an orator averts them from addressing this 
affordance in the wider context of post-truthfulness and genuinely thinking through 
the possible political implications of such rhetoric. 
		
 In fact, as Walsh’s own well-chosen example of the all-too-familiar prototype 
of the pub prankster demonstrates, a fictional account embedded in nonfictional 
context resist—not only falsification but—any relevant response from the 
interlocutor. Thus an intuitive consideration would suggest that fictionality as a 
rhetorical resource rather suppresses than invites dialogue, at least as far as 
informativity, in Walsh’s terms, is concerned. This was indeed the case with the True 
Finns campaign video, as well as numerous other publicity stunts by populist parties 
around Europe: one cannot challenge their claims by providing contrasting 
information, expert point of view, or data, and what one is left with is an invitation to 
react affectively—and in the social media-dominated narrative environments, 
moreover, share affectively. In the story economy of social media, where narrative 
rhetoric is transformed into a rhetoric of sharing, it is precisely the affective reaction 
to storytelling and not the narrative’s informative content that is being foregrounded 
in the collective “cognitive economy of communication” (see target essay). Therefore, 
social media are well suited to amplify the rhetorical power of fictionality understood 
in the Walshian sense, as a communication whose relevance does not rely upon its 
referential or other type of informativity. 
 Fictionality’s potential to mute opposing points of view is not only a logical 
consequence (to argue against—what?), but has its roots in the long history of 
storytelling. Locating the rhetorical power of fictionality in its “beyond referentiality” 
status is prominent through the entire history of Western rhetoric. As Walsh notes in 
his target essay, the idea of “higher,” nonreferential and hence universal truth of 
fiction, dating back to Aristotle’s notion of poiesis, is roughly in tandem with Walsh’s 
own definition of fictionality as a rhetorical gesture whose position toward 
informativity is at the same time reflective, indirect, and indifferent (Walsh 18). 
		
Moreover, the cultures of storytelling from Aristotle to Enlightenment were more or 
less dominated by the logic of the exemplum: the point of the story, whether invented 
or rooted in historical events, was to provide a moral example; the backdrop against 
which a narrative was to be evaluated was not that of reference but of the underlying, 
shared structure of norms and values, authorized by God, the sovereign, or other such 
fixed authority. 
 Moreover, stories with morals never ceased to exist in the modern times, and 
the current rise of populism and neo-moralism is partly fueled by the renaissance of 
narrative didacticism. I have argued elsewhere (Mäkelä, Lessons) that the story logic 
of social media favors exemplarity over referentiality. It replaces fixed authority with 
emergent authority, created by the like-minded circulation and reframing of 
experientially loaded narratives. Such social-media induced changes in rhetoric 
pertain particularly to narrative form. The social media afterlife of viral narratives is a 
material manifestation of the alleged universality of narrative truth—the product of 
engaging social media storytelling is “true in so many ways,” regardless of its origin 
either as an utterance (who told you this?) or as a representation (did it actually 
happen?). The affective and experiential truth is cemented in the concrete shares and 
likes, and even if the original narrative were falsified, the shared experience remains 
intact and “true.” 
 Thus far I have only considered Walsh’s theory in contexts that are 
unquestionably narrative, and indeed, I am in strong agreement with Walsh’s 
(somewhat cautious) suggestion that the rhetorical notion of fictionality should be 
limited to narrative rhetoric, instead of covering for any indirect, figurative, or 
imagination-induced rhetorical gesture. Walsh arrives at this distinction a bit 
hesitantly for the obvious reason that this limitation appears to be more embedded in 
		
the scholarly tradition and conventional language use than being a logical 
consequence of relevance theory. Another reason for Walsh to not be fully explicit in 
delimiting fictionality to narrative rhetoric might be that along with narrative comes 
worldmaking, which in turn speaks for those ontological worldmaking theories of 
fictionality that Walsh wants to dissociate himself from. Yet the perennial questions 
relating to “fictional truth” in rhetoric and literary studies, clearly focusing on 
narrative forms, are so close to Walsh’s concerns that this limitation comes almost 
naturally. In research, distinctions are often more welcome than generalizations. That 
being said, the doctrine of relevance, coupled with narrativity, issues another 
challenge, for narrative rhetoric in its prototypically experiential form (as defined by 
the first-generation cognitive narratologists), even if conforming to actual experience, 
is not primarily an informative mode. Hence telling apart nonfictional narrativity from 
fictional based on the question of informative relevance may turn out to be 
complicated. 
 All in all, contemporary narrative environments abound with wonderful test 
cases for a rhetorical fictionality scholar, yet the muddy waters of manipulative 
rhetoric online will produce ever new challenges to theorists like Walsh who are keen 
on producing universal definitions. Sometimes fuzzy sets need fuzzy methods and 
terminology. One of my recent favorites among approaches to post-truthfulness 
resonates with the dark side of Walsh’s notion of fictionality: political scientist Ari-
Elmeri Hyvönen coins the term “careless speech” (as an antimony of Foucault’s 
“fearless speech”) to denote political discourse that is 
unconcerned not only with truth but also with the world as a common space in 
which things become public. It means an unwillingness to engage with other 
perspectives, a reluctance to accept that speech has repercussions and words 
		
matter. It involves creating uncertainty over whether what is said aloud is 
actually meant; it means believing that anything can be unsaid. [ . . . ] Rather 
than trying to persuade, careless speech seeks to create confusion and bring 
democratic debate to a halt. (3) 
The True Finns campaign video as a rhetorical gesture does precisely that: it is 
excessively marked as fiction, pretending as not having any consequences in the 
actuality as a speech act. With its superfluous fictionality, it both thwarts any attempt 
at a reasonable critique as well as anticipates the affective responses that can then be 
turned against the critics who wind up looking like fools who cannot tell fact from 
fiction. Yet, as becomes evident from Hyvönen’s definition, “careless speech” rarely 
flaunts its fictionality the way my example video does. In the contemporary political 
context, rhetorical gestures implying nonchalance toward informativity or factual 
truths appear to serve rather community-strengthening and thus also excluding than 
conventionally persuading functions. Therefore, it is not enough to concentrate on the 
orator, but one needs to take into account the collective meaning-making practices; in 
the context of fictionality and stories that are “true in so many ways” (but not 
factually), we might also speak of “careless interpretation” (see also Nurminen). 
 What is crucially needed are pragmatic and empirical mappings of the 
affordances of fictionality in narrative environments where the role of fictionality has 
been hitherto undermined. If not properly methodized, the Walshian approach will 
remain in the shadow of theories emphasizing fictional worldmaking, for these are the 
theories that are supported—in intuitive and popular understanding—by the 
contemporary cultural dominant: speculative fiction. While the True Finns campaign 
video takes the most out of this macro genre, Walsh’s theory explains much more 
convincingly its cunning rhetorical, contextual, and collective dynamic than any of 
		
the previous, ontologically oriented approaches. Technical as it may seem, Walsh’s 
theory of fictionality may prove the next big contextualist thing in narrative theory. 
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